

Chapter Four
THE CUBAN EXIGENCY

Introduction

When President Kennedy, on 22 October 1962, disclosed to the nation the fact of the military build-up in Cuba by the USSR, including the indisputable evidence of the presence of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and clearly stated the counter action determined upon by the United States, he spoke with the assured knowledge of an effective build-up of the military power of the United States to carry out the proposed course of action.

The primary responsibility for implementing the President's policy of a preliminary "quarantine" of Cuba was delegated to the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) and the contingency plans appropriate to the area were revised to meet the particular situation. Army and Air Force combat commands were alerted to prepare for invasion, should such become necessary, and the retaliatory power of the Strategic Air Command was stepped up to an increased alert posture. The decision was made that should a shooting war develop, action would be restricted to conventional weapons unless the situation escalated into a major conflict.

The Military Air Transport Service played a significant part in building up that attitude of preparedness. The world-wide organization of MATS bases and operating locations, the familiarity of MATS pilots with routes and conditions and the techniques of



handling emergency situations were key factors in enabling the combat forces to attain the required readiness posture. Although the MATS airlift force was already heavily committed for at least three major exercises in addition to such missions as the Teheran earthquake disaster relief, the Army ROTO plan, and the United Nations operations in the Congo, and, further, was just completing the unscheduled airlift generated by RAPID ROAD, the command and control of the airlift force was such that the new requirements could be met with a minimum of dislocation for regularly scheduled airlift commitments. In common with the other major commands, MATS surged to meet the situation in accordance with the advanced defense condition, 16 October 1962. That was accomplished by increasing authorized flying hours for each aircrew, placing support activities on a 24-hour day, spotting for duty the maximum number of aircraft in an operational status, waiving or limiting aircraft operational restrictions and periodic inspection requirements that did not affect flying safety, imposing a close watch over aircraft utilization and shifting all the missions they could handle, which were not hard-core military requirements, to commercial carriers.

Waivers of MATS Airlift Operations Manual 55-1 were granted to the transport air forces for crews which were on specific, Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed contingency missions and the C-124s which were on formation flying training. Those waivers included:

- (1) 24-hour crew duty time instead of the normal 18 hours; (2)



~~SECRET~~

30-hour crew duty time for C-133 augmented crews as against the normal 27 hours; (3) increasing the take-off gross weight to 194,500 lbs for C-124Cs and 180,000 lbs for C-124As; (4) the number of troops carried by the C-135s was increased to 125 instead of the peacetime 84; (5) crews were authorized to fly 150 hours per month to a quarterly total of 350 hours instead of the normal 125 hours per month and 330 hours quarterly.

~~(SECRET)~~ Conventional Weapons Airlift. One of the first tasks to devolve upon MATS was to provide airlift to assure that an ample supply of conventional weapons and ammunition was assembled in the operations area - the southeast portion of the United States.

At 1700Z hours on 18 October, MATS Airlift Command Posts were directed to hold all C-118, C-124 and C-133 cargo type aircraft in Europe until further word. Those loaded were authorized to continue eastward to offload. Beginning the same day, MATS aircraft flew 54 missions to airlift a varied assortment of conventional weapons from such distant places as Turkey, North Africa, Italy, France, Germany, England, Puerto Rico, as well as from stations in the United States, to MacDILL, McCoy, Homestead and Robins Air Force Bases.¹ The Air Force Logistics Command was able to furnish information on the exact amount, type and location of material as a result of its modern communications and accounting system. (Sp 4)

1. MATS Operational Directive (MOD) 1688-62 and subsequent MCDs. For a detailed list of those missions see Hist EASTAF. Jul-Dec 62, Appendix IX, Table A; see also MATS Cuban Crisis Chronology, SD IV-1.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(SECRET)~~ Priorities Established. Requests for airlift flooded MATS as the deployment of the combat forces got under way and on 21 October, MATS sent a message to the Chief of Staff Air Force stating that the heavy transport capability had been fully committed and requesting guidance on allocation of capability among 2 the users. MATS was concerned over (1) the lack of system for remaining within its capability and (2) a system to identify priorities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the Cuban build-up be given priority over all other airlift activities, 3 including formation flying training. CINCLANT, therefore, established the order of priorities as: (1) Ammo move, Charleston/Guantanomo; (2) Marine Fighter move, Cherry Point/Key West; (3) Marine LAAM Battalion move, 29 Palms/Cherry Point. (Gp. 4)

Control Teams. Control team requirements were determined for stations scheduled for transit by MATS aircraft in support of the operations plans, and work-loads were furnished by Operations planners. Manpower requirements were obtained and the information 4 sent to the transport air forces and the using organizations. A Support Squadron Provisional was established at Pope AFB and a second at Campbell Army Airfield. Control teams were established at sixteen other locations.

2. MATS Msg, MAOTO/CAP/MCP/TCC 21-K-02, 21/0210Z (SECRET Gp.4)
3. Msg, AFOOP-TR 21 Oct 62 (SECRET Gp.4).
4. MATS Msg, MAOOC 25-37K 20/2100 Oct 62 (SECRET, material used unclassified).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Command and Control of deployed personnel and of all MATS aircraft remained with the Commander, MATS, except for the personnel specifically assigned to augment the Tactical Air Command, which numbered some 376 personnel by the end of the operation. On 21 October, the first MATS personnel to be deployed were sent to Homestead AFB, Florida, in response to a request from TAC to supply three Air Transportation Supervisors and ten Air Freight Specialists.

5

~~(SECRET)~~ Ammo Airlift to Guantanamo. A force of fourteen C-135, seven C-121 and six C-118 aircraft airlifted approximately 340 tons of ammunition from Charleston AFB, and rations from Turner AFB, to Guantanamo. During that operation, MATS suffered its only aircraft accident. A C-135 aircraft, loaded with ammunition, crashed while making a landing approach in accordance with instructions not to overfly Cuban territory. The seven crew members lost were: Captain James F. Bailey, aircraft commander Captain John Baird, first pilot, First Lieutenant Jack F. Douberteen, copilot, Captain James E. Connard, navigator, First Lieutenant Hal P. Hogge, navigator, Technical Sergeant Lester C. Elliott, flight engineer, and Staff Sergeant Booker T. Rigsby, loadmaster. (Gp. 4)

~~(SECRET)~~ Marine Airlifts. On 19 October 1962, MATS was alerted to prepare for airlifts in support of the Marine Corps, which were given top priority by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Gp.4)

5. MOD 1722-62 (SECRET Gp.4); Special Interest Airlift Requirements and Current Status Report (SIARACS) 22 Oct 62 (SECRET Gp.4)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MATSH-29

197

~~(SECRET)~~ The first was a move from El Toro, California, to
6
Guantanamo NAS, Cuba. The Federal Aviation Agency aircraft
control points on both sides of the continent were alerted, and
altitudes blocked in Los Angeles area to give the aircraft a
500-foot separation and 10-minute landing interval as 92 MATS air-
craft converged on the onload station. As this was the first
experience for the Marines of airlift on MATS aircraft, some
confusion arose from the different methods used in loading the
aircraft. Expert assistance from WESTAF, however, soon righted
the situation and the airlift was accomplished within 48 hours.
Seventy C-124s, seven C-133s and fifteen C-135s moved 2,203
passengers and 1,074 tons of cargo. The first aircraft left El
Toro at 0505 hours, 21 October, and the last landed at Guantanamo,
7
1920 hours, 23 October. (Gp. 4)

~~(SECRET)~~ The movement of a Marine Air Group from Cherry
Point MCAS and Beaufort MCAS to Key West was accomplished 22-23
8
October. Twenty-eight missions from Cherry Point, eleven C-124,
ten C-133 and seven C-135 aircraft, airlifted 232 passengers and
305 tons of cargo, while seven missions from Beaufort MCAS, three
C-124, two C-133 and two C-135, took care of 82 passengers and
9
35 tons of cargo. (Gp.4)

- 6. MOD 1718-62 (SECRET Gp.4).
- 7. MCP SIARACS, 24 Oct 62 (SECRET Gp.4).
- 8. MOD 1729-62 (SECRET Gp.4).
- 9. MCP SIARACS, 24 Oct 62 (SECRET Gp.4).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(~~SECRET~~) A Marine Missile Group was moved from Twenty-nine Palms, California (onloading at George AFB) to Cherry Point MCAS,
10
23-25 October. That airlift involved 67 MATS aircraft to
11
transport 390 passengers and 967.2 tons of cargo. (Gp.4)

The airlift of the Marines drew high praise from the Chief of Naval Operations. In a letter to the Chief of Staff Air Force
12
he said:

"Please accept the congratulations and appreciation of the Navy and Marine Corps for the absolutely magnificent performance of MATS in positioning our Marines from the West Coast into Guantanamo. The efficiency and dispatch with which this operation was carried out attests to outstanding coordination and direction from the top down through and including the line mechanics for the individual aircraft."

As a result of that experience, MATS was designated as the single point of contact for future Marine airlift requirements and training of the Marines in MATS' loading techniques was
13
instituted.

Army Airlift. Army forces moved to the southeastern area of the United States included infantry, armored, airborne and logistical troops. MATS airlifted the 59th Army Artillery Group from El Paso, Texas, onloading at Bigg AFB, to Homestead AFB. Nineteen aircraft were used to move 169 passengers and 486.9 tons of
14
cargo, 25-26 October.

- 10. MOD 1730-62 (SECRET Gp.4).
- 11. MCP SIARACS, 24 Oct 62 (SECRET Gp.4).
- 12. Ltr, Anderson to LeMay, 26 Oct 62, (with endorsements by Gen. LeMay and Gen. Kelly, SD IV-2).
- 13. Msg, Commandant Marine Corps to Marine Units, subj: Joint USAF USMC Air Movement Training, SD IV-3.
- 14. MOD 1758-62 (SECRET Gp.4).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MATS Combat Commitments. While MATS was responsible for the airlift of combat forces and had to surge to meet those requirements, the command was also responsible, in any potential war situation, for participation in the airdrop and airlanding of combat troops. MATS, therefore, had to prepare to fulfill its obligations in that capacity simultaneously with the increased need for airlift services, which placed a double requirement on the available aircrues.

~~(SECRET)~~ Accelerated Airdrop Training. CINCLANT operations plans required airdrop and airlanding by MATS aircraft. On 21 December 1961, a meeting was held at Headquarters CINCLANT to discuss types of aircraft to be used for the airdrop of troops and cargo. It was decided that the C-124 aircraft would be used for that purpose until a sufficient number of more suitable aircraft became available. (Gp.4)

~~(SECRET)~~ In May 1962, MATS was directed by Headquarters USAF ¹⁵ to develop a formation flying capability for C-124 aircrues. A training program was therefore developed based on a peace-time schedule and the availability of equipment. Troop carrier wings were committed to be fully qualified in formation flying by 1 March 1963 and the air transport wings somewhat later. The possibility that the CINCLANT plans for Cuba might have to be implemented made it imperative that the training program be accelerated. (Gp. 4)

15. Msg, AFODC-OP 85595, 05/1637Z May (SECRET Gp.4).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MATSH-29

200

(~~SECRET~~) The most immediate problem was the procurement of the necessary equipment for both personnel and cargo drops. On 10 October 1962, representatives of MATS, AFLC and WRAMA met at Donaldson AFB to consider ways to expedite the procurement of personnel and cargo drop kits, and Headquarters USAF was advised
16 of the requirement. (Gp.4).

(~~SECRET~~) On 13 October, EASTAF and WESTAF were directed to conduct a crash program to procure the necessary personnel and cargo drop kits through their own resources and around the clock
17 work was directed until the project was completed. They were directed to have 216 aircrews qualified in day formation flying by 24 October. JCS-directed airlifts, however, had to be accomplished and the training program was drastically curtailed for
18 four days, 20-24 October. As a result of a change in the timing of the proposed airdrops in the operations plans under revision, night formation flying was required and training was instituted on 23 October. The total commitment was for 216 crews to be
19 CARP, day and night formation qualified by 30 October. The training was accomplished as shown in the following table:

- 16. MATS Msg, MAXWP 1161K, 12 Oct 62 (~~SECRET~~ Gp.4).
- 17. MATS Msg, MCP/TCC 1167K, 13 Oct 62; MACCO 1169K 13 Oct 62 (~~SECRET~~ Gp.4)
- 18. Carp and Formation Training Summary (~~SECRET~~ Gp.4) SD IV-4
- 19. MATS Msg, MAOOC 1349K; MACOC 1262K, 23 Oct 62 (~~SECRET~~ Gp.4)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

<u>Date</u>	<u>CARP</u>	<u>DAY FORMATION</u>	<u>NIGHT FORMATION</u>
13 Oct	259	42	0
18 Oct	275	96	0
23 Oct	280	160	0
27 Oct	300	232	101
30 Oct	322	299	228
26 Nov	339	330	305

(SECRET,
Gp.4).

~~(SECRET)~~ Revision of Operations Plans. In accordance with JCS directives, temporary operational control of the USSTRICOM forces earmarked for the Cuban operations was passed to CINCLANT. The air component of those forces became Air Forces Atlantic (AFLANT) and operational plans for those forces were prepared by CINCAFLANT at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB. The original CINCLANT OPlan 314 provided for all air operations, including both fighter and troop carrier and transport requirements. It was found desirable to split the fighter portion as a separate plan, OPlan 312, and the troop carrier portion as OPlan 316. MATS contingency operations plan 116 was revised to meet the new planning requirements as fast as information was received from AFLANT. MATS supporting OPlan 316 was published piecemeal as each Annex was prepared and revised in accordance with changes from AFLANT. That plan would have required the deployment of approximately 4,400 MATS personnel if it had become necessary to implement it fully. (Gp.4).

Headquarters MATS ADVON. In order to expedite the planning of airlift and airdrop commitments, a MATS ADVON was set up, 29

~~SECRET~~

October, at Langley AFB, under the command of Major General
George B. Dany, DCS/Operations. Liaison was maintained by
placing a colonel from DCS/Plans and one from DCS/Operations on
TDY at Langley on alternate weeks.

However, the political tension had eased considerably so
planning continued on a less urgent basis. The ADVON at Langley
was discontinued, 10 November 1962, and a new one set up at
Homestead AFB on the same day, to provide an advanced echelon of
MATS Headquarters for any emergency operations which might be
required.²¹

Summary. Because MATS airlift missions are often integrated
and coordinated to achieve maximum utilization of airframes, it
is difficult to determine exactly how many missions were flown
as a direct result of the Cuban build-up. Approximately 1,633
personnel were deployed for various activities, excluding the
aircrews. A conservative estimate would be that 488 missions,
which airlifted 6,738 tons of cargo and 5,018 passengers, were
flown in direct support of the Cuban requirements.²²

Effect on Scheduled Operations. While much of the MATS air-
lift force was engaged in hard-core military operations, depot
levels of priority freight did not get unduly out of hand nor
were rotational passengers delayed. Outsize cargo was diverted

- 20. Hq MATS SO G-140, 29 Oct 62, SD I-1
- 21. Hq MATS SO G-147, 10 Nov 62, SD I-1
- 22. DCS/Compt. Quarterly Narrative Report Single Manager for
Airlift Service, RCS. DD-I&L (Q) 439, for 2.63



to other means of transportation for an indefinite period.

For some time an increasing proportion of MATS scheduled passenger and cargo operations in support of DOD requirements for military establishments overseas had been assigned to commercial airlines through contracts. It was possible, therefore, for MATS to draw upon a reserve of commercial aircraft to supply the immediate needs for passenger airlift and for some cargo airlift. The 15 per cent increase in commercial airlift evident during FY-62 soared to a new height in the second quarter of FY-63. During September 1962, 69 per cent of DOD passenger traffic was carried by commercial airlines. The 42 per cent of cargo traffic carried commercially in September, soared to 56 per cent in October 1962.

Participation of the Technical Services. Airlift service was only part of the total MATS contribution to the Cuban build-up requirements. Each of the technical services made noteworthy contributions to the combined effort.

Air Weather Service. The need for weather service was greatly increased as the Armed Forces braced for immediate action. The 2d Weather Group serviced elements of the Tactical Air Command and the Army in the southeastern United States. At the onset of the build-up a command post was set up at Headquarters, 2d Weather Group, at Langley AFB, to control all available resources and to coordinate the field weather elements with the needs of the commands involved.

The situation provided an opportunity to test and evaluate the Weather Task Force (WETAF) concept which had been developed during the past two years. It was designed to provide each major force element of the Tactical Air Command and the Continental Army Command with a small cadre of specially trained weather personnel at its home station. The weather men were also trained in the unit specialty, for example, those supporting the airborne units were also airborne qualified. When such units were deployed, the associated weather cadre deployed with them. Weather communications and tactical equipment were pre-positioned and load-listed to accompany the weather men as required. The Weather Task Force represented 21 per cent of the total forecasters and 10 per cent of the total observers of the 2d Weather Group. The 'tailored' units had been exercised in connection with the various STRICOM exercises during the previous twelve months.

The 3d and 4th Weather Groups supported the aircraft dispersal actions of the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command while the 6th Weather Squadron (Mobile) and the 8th Weather Group provided weather forecasters for CINCLANT in addition to providing weather service for MATS and Reserve troop carrier deployments. The important job of supplying special weather analysis on a global basis was also stepped up.

The AWS Climatological Center at Asheville, N.C. furnished climatological data on probabilities, by hours of the day, for

23. Ltr, Comdr AWS to Comdr MATS (Monthly letter), 3 Dec 62.



low, middle and high-level photographic reconnaissance, fighter-bomber strikes and airborne operations.

The 9th Weather Reconnaissance Group began twice-daily flights around Cuba on 29 October 1962 using the WB-50 aircraft of the 53d Weather Reconnaissance Squadron based at Kindley AFB, Bermuda. Three aircraft and crews of the 55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron from McClellan AFB were deployed to Kindley AFB to augment the 53d WRS. The daily flights covered 3,350 nautical miles each and were flown a minimum of 40 miles off-shore from Cuba. Weather observations were taken every twenty minutes while circling Cuba and the data was transmitted to Langley and Homestead Air Force Bases.

Air Photographic and Charting Service. The photographic documentation of Air Force activities during any period of more than routine procedures is one of the major responsibilities of the APCS. The Cuban situation, therefore, meant a period of intense effort for that Service.

The cameramen, photographers and specialists of the 1365th Photographic Squadron, Orlando AFB, were augmented by 135 personnel from the 1352d Photographic Group from Lookout Mountain, California and from Ent AFB, Colorado. Fifty-four combat documentary photographers were deployed in teams to MacDill, McCoy, Homestead and Patrick Air Force Bases, to Sanford and Key West Naval Air Stations, Florida and to Pope AFB, North Carolina.

APCS technicians, working on a crash basis, devised and installed forward and rear-looking 16mm motion picture cameras under the



center bomb shackles of six F-100 Supersabres of the Tactical Air Command in order to obtain the best possible action pictures.

Tests of the cameras on the F-100s showed that adequate over-the-target documentation of weapons employment could be obtained.

High speed, low altitude tests run with similar equipment fitted to RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance planes gave promise of the value of the technique for reconnaissance and enroute-to-target use.

A quick-change camera angle mechanism which enables the cameras to be declined zero to thirty degrees from horizontal in five-degree steps and a quick release for the camera control junction box, which enables rapid replacement, were the basic principles of the new devices, which provided increased advantages in the photographic coverage.

APCS furnished four RB-50 and four RC-130 aircraft which were based at Kindley AFB, Bermuda, and Lajes AB, Azores, under the operational control of CINCLANT, to be used for the purpose of visual photo coverage and positional information on surface vessels west of the Azores to Bermuda and Cuba. A portable photography laboratory from the 1370th Photo-Mapping Wing was also sent to Lajes. As of 20 November 1962 the aircraft had flown 87 missions logging 571 flying hours. Three H-21 helicopters were also made available to CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT at Langley AFB for use in the
24 Norfolk area.

24. Rpt, APSC Participation in Cuban Crisis Action, 26 Nov 62, (SECRET Gp.3, material used unclassified).

~~SECRET~~

MATSH-29

207

On 28 October, Headquarters USAF directed APCS to send two RC-130 and two RB-50 aircraft to CINCAFLANT at MacDill AFB, and also a portable photography laboratory. The aircraft were to be painted with UN markings and to be available for possible use in UN aerial inspection missions.

Air Rescue Service. From the very nature of its mission, the Air Rescue Service was involved heavily in the Cuban build-up. Fourteen fixed wing and eight Air Rescue helicopters provided continuing fire suppression and local base rescue service at Homestead, MacDill, McCoy and Key West. ARS controllers were on twenty-four hour duty at CINCLANT headquarters, Langley AFB, and ARS headquarters, Orlando AFB, and other locations. Pararescue men with self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) stood by for possible action.

Air Rescue men were airborne immediately on 26 October, when a SAC U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was lost on a mission. Two HC-54 aircraft of the 55th ARSq were airborne at approximately 2000Z hours and continued the search for seven hours until recalled. Two HC-54s from MacDill AFB and seven HU-16s, also joined in the search operations.

Between 20 October and 21 November 1962, Air Rescue aircraft had flown a total of 935 hours 20 minutes in support of the Cuba operations, HH-43Bs 221:20; HC-54s, 325:00; HU-16s, 386:40 hours.

~~(SECRET)~~ Detachment 4, ARS, was organized at Homestead AFB on 25 October. It included personnel from Hamilton AFB, California,

25. ARCOI, Cuban Crisis Chronology, 14 Dec 1962, (SECRET, Gp.4).

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Goose Bay, Labrador, Eglin AFB and a Reserve ARS_q which had been called to active duty. Two of the three crews were on daily alert, the primary on a thirty minute alert status and the secondary on one hour alert status. (SECRET, Gp. 4)

(~~SECRET~~) In addition to deployment to southeast US, all Air Rescue units were on additional alert throughout the United States to provide for possible emergencies because of increased activity of loaded aircraft and frequent shipments of hazardous cargo. (Gp.4)

Aeromedical Services. While, fortunately, aeromedical transport service was not required on an extensive scale, planning for such service was accomplished. The medical annexes were prepared to support the operational plans of MATS and CINCLANT. The first revisions of existing contingency plans were completed by 26 October 1962, and were refined further after the first urgency subsided.

The MATS Command Surgeon, Brigadier General Kenneth E. Pietcher, held a conference at Headquarters MATS, 21 October 1962, which was attended by Lt. Colonel George Flanagan, Medical Services Officer, WESTAF, Colonel Walter V. Cook, Commander, 1st Aeromedical Transport Group, and other members of the aeromedical transportation staffs, at which details for the preparation of the medical annexes were determined.

(~~SECRET~~) Aeromedical personnel made surveys of Orlando AFB, Herndon Airport, Opalocka, McCoy, and Eglin Air Force Bases, to determine their suitability as aeromedical ports of debarkation. Aeromedical Evacuation Control Centers were planned at those lo-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

cations, ready to be put into operation if and when they were needed, and the necessary communications facilities were installed ready for use. (~~SECRET~~, Gp.4)

At the request of the MATS Command Surgeon, the 63d Troop Carrier Wing at Donaldson AFB constructed three aeromedical evacuation patient loading ramps, which were held at Donaldson until required.

Twelve ambulance-buses were requisitioned, two from Scott, three from McGuire, one from Dover, two from Keesler, two from Andrews and two from Maxwell, which were airlifted to the operations area, ready for immediate use as required.

Headquarters EASTAF was directed to prepare sixteen in-flight medical equipment and supply kits, which were packed ready for shipment, and also to prepare thirty flight nurse kits to be ready to issue to the 12th AMTS upon implementation of the operations plans.

The 1360th USAF Hospital at Orlando, which would have borne the brunt of any extensive operational casualties, was requested to supply lists of required augmentation of both personnel and equipment to meet the work-loads indicated in the medical annexes. The equipment was airlifted and pre-positioned and the personnel were placed on a stand-by orders for possible deployment.

~~SECRET~~

A liaison office was manned at Homestead AFB, Florida, by personnel from the 1st Aeromedical Transport Group, which continued in operation until Hq MATS ADVON was discontinued, 27 November 26 1962.

Augmentation Forces. Considerable effort went into planning for the use of augmentation forces in case it became necessary to draw upon those resources.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet. An overall MATS capability estimate including a breakout of CRAF capability, was prepared and forwarded to Headquarters USAF, 23 October 1962. On 24 October, the Air Force Command Post requested a daily submission of the CRAF Airlift Readiness Report beginning 0600Z hours 25 October. Twenty-five CRAF carriers were notified by message to submit reports showing the number of aircraft by type that would be available within the ZI for transocean operation within 6, 12, 24 and 48 hours after the reporting time. On 29 October a 96-hour time was added.

On 27 October, a survey was made of the CRAF cargo aircraft to determine capability of conversion to passenger operation. The Directors of the Atlantic and Pacific CRAF Operations Boards were requested to provide technical advisers to assist in revising the CRAF operational plan. On 28 October, the technical advisers together with the Civil Air Branch of DCS/Plans began developing a MATS Oplan 182 and revising MM 55-8 and the work was completed by 31 October.

26. Hq MATS SO G-15¹⁴, 27 Nov 62, SD I-1.



~~SECRET~~

Air Force Reserves and Air National Guard. Plans were prepared for calling up the Reserves and Air National Guard should the need develop. Notification procedures were prepared and sent to the units which would come under the control of Headquarters
²⁷
MATS.

Two Air National Guard units, the 133d Air Transport Wing at Minneapolis, Minnesota, and the 146th Air Transport Wing at Van Nuys, California, which had just been released from active duty in connection with the Berlin build-up, volunteered their services. They accomplished 29 missions as part of their normal training program to places as far apart as Greenland and South America and thus airlifted 266 tons of cargo which would otherwise have accumulated as back-log.

SUN SHADE Exercises

~~(SECRET)~~ With the subsidence of the urgency in the political aspects of the Cuban situation, and since the build-up of forces provided a favorable opportunity, a series of exercises was planned to test selected portions of CINCAFLANT's operations plans 316D and 316E and the MATS supporting plan 116-62. The first of the exercises, SUN SHADE I, was scheduled to take place 19-21 November 1962 with subsequent exercises, SUN SHADE II through V, operating on each successive Monday. EASTAF, as the designated controlling transport air force, prepared the operations order, MATS OPORD
²⁸
31-62. (Gp.4)

- 27. Ltr, Hq MATS subj: Notification Procedures, 9 Nov 62, (SECRET, material used unclassified), SD IV-5.
- 28. MATS OPORD 31-62 was published in message form, ETOPL-1578-L, 16 Nov 62, (SECRET, Gp.4) SD 69 in Hist EASTAF Jul-Dec 62, Vol. VI.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(~~SECRET~~) The Concept of Operations for the exercises was that selected MATS C-124 aircraft, configured for airdrop, would proceed to specified onload stations, pick up the troops and deliver them to the staging area then stand-down until the employment phase. During the stand-down, turn around procedures, briefings, crew rest and other related activities would be accomplished. The employment phase, following the one-day stand-down, would consist of a pre-dawn take off, night join-up and formation flight, to arrive at the drop zone one hour after sun-up. The specific objective was to exercise the Command and Control system, participating CALSUs, MCTs and ESTs, ARLANT loading teams and briefing teams, support facilities at staging bases, formation flying for aircrews and formation drops of personnel and equipment. (Gp.4)

SUN SHADE I

Exercise SUN SHADE I was operated under Frag Order Number One to MATS OPORD 31-62, on 19-22 November 1962.²⁹ The on-load bases were designated as Pope AFB and Campbell Army Airfield and the staging as Eglin and Tyndall Air Force Bases. The 1607th Air Transport Wing was directed to provide 20 primary and two back-up C-124 aircraft to operate from Campbell AAF to Tyndall AFB and the 1608th Air Transport Wing was directed to provide 24 primary and two back-up C-124s for the Pope AFB & Eglin AFB staging base. CONAC Reserve units flying C-119 aircraft also participated in the exercise.

29. Msg, ETOPLE 1582 - L, 16 Nov 62, (~~SECRET~~, Gp.4), SD IV-6.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MATSH-29

213

~~(SECRET)~~ Command and Control ³⁰ of the MATS aircraft was exercised by Headquarters EASTAF through the deployment phase and until the aircraft reached the staging areas when command and control passed to the 44th Airlift Air Force (Provisional), with headquarters at Homestead AFB, for the employment phase. CINCAFLANT, through the 9th Air Force and the 12th Air Force, exercised control of the C-119 aircraft through the deployment phase, then control was assumed by the 44th Airlift Air Force (Prov.) for the employment phase. (Gp.3).

~~(SECRET)~~ Operation of the exercise proceeded as planned, until the employment phase, when the inclement weather over drop zones caused delay. ³¹ When a twenty-four hour day delay brought no change in the weather, the airdrops were cancelled and the troops airlanded at their respective off-load stations. 1,333 troops were airlanded at Campbell AAF and 1,652 at Pope AFB. (Gp. 4)

³² Problem Areas included (1) positioning of the aircraft. A section of C-124 aircraft was delayed for take off since they were positioned behind a section of delayed C-119 aircraft. (2) Aircraft mission numbers, deployment chalk numbers and employment chalk numbers were all tied to an aircraft assignment. This reduced flexibility of the movement control teams and could have resulted in delayed departures. (3) Definition of X-hour in the operations order did not agree with the time schedule in Frag

30. MAXMO 2919L, 15 Nov 62 (SECRET, Gp.3), SD IV-7.

31. MCP SIARACS, 22 Nov 62 (SECRET, Gp.4), SD IV-8.

32. Summary Report Exercise Sun Shade I (SECRET Gp.4), SD IV-9.

~~SECRET~~

Order 11. Upon notification this was corrected. (4) Neither the OPORD nor the Frag Order indicated fuel requirements. (5) The organization having operational control of the airborne operations expected the aircraft operating unit to conduct necessary briefings after arrival at the onload station. Consequently, much time was lost at the expense of crew rest time for last minute briefing preparations. (6) Controlled departure time and DZ time: to make Pope VOR flight plan time, lead aircraft had to average 190 knots IAS from first position reporting point to the point of descent, because of unfavorable winds. (7) Unclassified news releases contained nearly all information being handled as secret. In this instance, a news release written by TAC was cleared by DOD, which MATS then released to the wings and authorized publication. It would appear that there was some lack of coordination between Operations and Information personnel at the DOD-USAF level.

SUN SHADE Exercises II-V did not take place.

